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Abstract: We study dynamically consistent policy in a neoclassical overlapping generations
growth model where pollution externalities undermine health but are mitigated via tax-financed
abatement. With arbitrarily constant taxation, two steady states arise: an unstable ‘poverty
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levels of capital and then a weakly increasing function of the capital stock. The non-homogeneity
of the tax function along with its feedback effect on savings induces additional steady states,
stability reversals and oscillations.
Keywords: Time consistency, pollution, mortality, overlapping generations model, poverty
traps, endogenous fluctuations, optimal environmental policy.
JEL Classification: O11, O13, O23, O44, E32, H21, H23.
∗We thank seminar audiences at CEF 2010, SCE Prague 2012, SWET Paris 2012, ISI Development
Conference 2012, Asian Econometric Society Meetings 2012, GE Days York 2013, Warwick Summer
School on Economic Growth, 2014, Future of GE Conference (NYU-AUD) 2015, EWGET Glasgow 2016,
Universitat Autonoma Barcelona, Birmingham, City University, Kyung Hee University, Liverpool, NUS,
LUMS, Rochester, and especially Alioso Araujo, Joydeep Bhattacharya, Moni Shankar Bishnu, Stefano
Bosi, Shankha Chakraborty, Christian Ghiglino, Piero Gottardi, Cuong Le Van, Lin Liu, Michael Magill,
Stephen Morris, Hyun Park, Apostolis Philippopoulos, Martine Quinzii, Thomas Seegmuller, Karl Shell,
Gilles Saint-Paul, Mich Tvede, Yiannis Vailakis, Dimitrios Varvarigos, Thierry Verdier, and Randy Wright
for their helpful comments. Jafarey and Goenka were partly funded by British Academy Small Scale
Research Grant (SG-47102), and Goenka also by FASS Research Grant R-122-000-131-112. The usual
disclaimer applies.
†Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, JG Smith Building, Birmingham, UK B15
2TT; Email: a.goenka@bham.ac.uk
‡Department of Economics, City University London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB; Email:
s.s.jafarey@city.ac.uk
§Department of Economics. University of Birmingham, JG Smith Building, Birmingham, UK B15
2TT; Email: w.pouliot@bham.ac.uk
1 Introduction
Pollution, especially particulate matter (PM), nitrogen dioxide, sulphur dioxide, and
ozone, leads to increase of cardiovascular and respiratory diseases resulting in premature
mortality.1 There is a three-way link between pollution, mortality and economic growth:
while economic growth reduces mortality rates through the effect of higher income (and
nutrition) and better health outcomes,2 it also generates pollution which in turn increases
mortality. Changes in mortality in turn affect savings decisions and thus, growth and
pollution. This paper studies time consistent taxes in an overlapping generations model
that incorporates this three-way effect and pollution is treated as an externality.
Recent economic literature has recognised the possibility that multiple steady states,
poverty traps and cycles can arise from the interplay between the three factors and pro-
posed various policy options, via either golden-rule, steady state analysis or Pigouvian
taxes, to offset these outcomes.3 It has, however, not studied optimal policy. This view-
point is important as it addresses the issues of dynamic consistency and implementability
which are both problematic in overlapping generations. There is a well-known commit-
ment problem in imposing taxes on future generations (see Ghiglino and Tvede [2000],
and the survey by Erosa and Gervais [2001]). John et al. [1995] highlight the problem
of using pre-committed Pigouvian taxes in such an overlapping generations set-up with
externalities. We characterise the optimal tax function, and in addition show that the
1Water pollution, carcinogens of both gaseous and soil contaminant types, heavy metals (such as
mercury), persistent organic pollutants (POPs such as DDT, dioxin), etc. are other types of pollution that
lead to premature mortality. There is robust micro evidence that exposure to particulate matter PM10
and PM2.5, leads to increased cardiovascular disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)
and, controlling for other factors, an increase in mortality (see Ayres [2006], Huang et al. [2012], Evans
et al. [2013], Miller et al. [2007], Pope et al. [2004], HEI [2010], Viegi et al. [2006]). A 10 µg per
cubic meter increase in PM10 leads to an increase in mortality by 0.51% and if other gases such as ozone,
nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide and carbon monoxide which are correlated with PM10 are taken into
account the distribution of mortality shifts to the right (Samet et al. [2000]). These effects are present
in both developed and developing countries.
2Preston [1975] was one of the earliest papers to document the positive effect of income on life ex-
pectancy. The recent survey by Cutler et al. [2006] documents this effect across countries and within
countries. In their interpretation, income alone is not sufficient but it is correlated with willingness for
effective public health delivery.
3See Jouvet et al. [2010]; Mariani et al. [2010], Varvarigos [2008], [2014]; Palivos and Varvarigos
[2017] and Raffin and Seegmuller [2014]. Also see Stokey [1998] who studies the first best problem in
a long-lived agent model with environmental externalities but no mortality effects. Wang, Zhang, and
Bhattarcharya [2015] study a complementary model where pollution affects morbidity but not mortality.
For earlier studies of taxes relying on steady state analysis to correct environmental externalities in
overlapping generations models see Bovenberg and Heijdra [1998], John and Pecchenino [1994], and John
et al. [1995].
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state contingent optimal taxes can alter the transition dynamics in the model.
We study a two-period overlapping generations model where the probability of survival
into old age is determined endogenously.4 Production of a single consumption-capital
good creates pollution as a by-product. Increased pollution increases the probability of
premature death but increased income has a prophylactic effect on mortality. The positive
effect of income on mortality follows the literature which has pointed out that increased
income can counteract some of the adverse effects of pollution via better nutrition and
greater access to health care.
The two contrary forces that affect mortality can result in a non-convexity that gives rise
to multiple interior steady states: a low capital, locally unstable steady state with lower
per capita consumption and life expectancy and a high capital “neoclassical” steady state
with higher per capita consumption and life expectancy.5 The latter steady state can be
either locally stable or induce oscillations around it; in most of our analysis, we assume
the former possibility. Moreover, an increase in the tax rate can increase the steady
state capital in the neoclassical steady state while simultaneously widening the basin of
attraction of the trivial steady state.6
The main contribution of the paper is to characterise optimal abatement policy in a second
best context. The government imposes a wage tax on the young in each period. This tax
affects their savings behaviour and next period’s capital stock, imposing contradictory
externalities on the next generation: a higher capital stock means higher incomes which
reduce the next generation’s mortality but also means higher emissions which increase it.
It is not possible in our model to offset the externality entirely by means of the wage tax.7
Thus, the government has only a second-best instrument to maximise a weighted sum
of life-cycle utilities of all generations, subject to each generation’s incentive constraints
regarding savings behaviour.
We establish the existence of an optimal tax function and derive its main characteristics.
First, below a threshold level of capital, the optimal tax is zero and there is no pollution
abatement, as at low levels of pollution, the marginal effects of additional pollution are
4See Chakraborty [2004] and Bhattacharya and Qiao [2007].
5In addition, most overlapping generations models yield a trivial steady state with zero economic
activity and ours is no exception.
6The former possibility has been shown in the literature to arise in a variety of contexts: environ-
mental degradation imposes costs that are external to each decision-maker so any policy that offsets this
externality helps reduce these costs and if the balance is right, actually promotes growth (see Economides
and Philippopoulos [2008], John et al. [1995], Mariani et al. [2010], and Palivos and Varvarigos [2017]
for an analysis of such effects in a variety of settings).
7On page 14 of Section 3, we discuss why the wage tax is the only reasonable tax instrument in our
framework.
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negligible.8 Second, in the region of positive taxation, the optimal tax is weakly increasing
in the capital stock. Third, we show via numerical simulations that the optimal tax at
any given capital stock increases with the size of the inter-generational discount factor of
the planner.
While the characteristics are unsurprising and plausible, the first of these, i.e. the non-
homogeneity of the optimal tax, creates further intriguing dynamic possibilities. In partic-
ular, it can induce multiple versions of each type of steady state, whereas under arbitrary
taxation there would be at most one of each. In other words, whenever no abatement
can be optimal in a steady state of either type, the possibility arises that there is another
steady state of the same type with positive abatement.9 Moreover such multiplicity of
steady states can lead to a reversal in stability properties relative to the arbitrary tax
case: a poverty trap can become a sink while a neoclassical steady state can become a
source. Finally, optimal taxes may introduce endogenous fluctuations in the neighbour-
hood of either type of steady state. Such dynamics arise even when the government places
relatively high weight on the utility of future generations.
Such results are also relevant to a broader literature that has addressed the interaction of
economic policies and endogenous fluctuations in dynamic general equilibrium (see Wood-
ford [1994a]). One strand of this literature (see Goenka and Liu [2012] and Grandmont
[1985]) shows that state-dependent economic policies can be used to stabilize endogenous
economic fluctuations. Another strand shows that simple, non-state dependent feedback
policies can themselves be a source of endogenous economic fluctuations (see Goenka
[1994a], Goenka [1994b], Grandmont [1986], Smith [1994], Woodford [1994b]), while state-
dependent feedback policies may eliminate these. In this paper we present a different type
of difficulty: when the private response to optimal policy shows potential non-convexities
and the policy-maker is restricted to second-best instruments, state-dependent policies
can generate non-linear dynamics in the evolution of state variables.
Our results have both a mathematical and a policy interpretation. From the mathematical
standpoint, arbitrarily constant taxes mean that the path of capital is traced out by
iterating a single first-order difference equation that links next period’s capital stock to
the current one. As is well known, this can be graphically depicted by a single one-
dimensional phase diagram that maps each period’s capital stock into next period’s. In
8Palivos and Varvarigos [2010] derive a similar result for a policy that maximises survival probability.
Note that life-cycle welfare per generation does not increase unambiguously with survival probability as
the direct positive effect of enhanced survival and the indirect positive effect due to greater incentives to
accumulate capital can be offset by the indirect negative effect that higher survival rates have on the net
return to savings. Our welfare criterion captures all three effects.
9The classification of a steady state as poverty trap versus neoclassical is determined by the slope of
the capital evolution map in the neighbourhood of that steady state.
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the presence of pollution externalities this map can generate two interior steady states:
a poverty trap and a neoclassical steady state, differentiated not just by levels of capital
but also by the respective slopes of the phase diagram as it crosses each steady state.
Under optimal taxation, a stable tax function replaces a constant tax and a shifting
family of phase diagrams replace the single one. This adds an additional dimension to the
dynamics and, together with the non-homogeneity of the tax function, drives the reversal
in dynamic stability. For example, if it is possible to have a steady state with zero optimal
taxation, then there can be one or more additional steady states with positive optimal
taxation. If a zero-tax steady state is a poverty trap then the additional steady state(s)
with positive taxation can be either poverty trap(s) or neoclassical. If the former, the
positive-tax poverty trap is locally stable. If zero taxation is also optimal at a neoclassical
steady state then, under the added contingency that higher taxes lead to higher capital
in a neoclassical steady state, two additional positive-tax, neoclassical steady states arise,
of which one will be locally unstable.
The emergence of fluctuations induced entirely by optimal policy is also related to the
shifts in the phase diagram as the tax rate evolves over time. If a small change in the
abatement tax is likely to produce a large shift in the phase diagram then the economy
can jump from a low capital, low tax equilibrium in one period to a high capital, high tax
equilibrium in the next. This happens even if the same economy evolves monotonically
under an arbitrarily constant tax rate.
In Section 2, the benchmark model with arbitrary tax policy is developed, its equilibrium
and dynamic properties are characterised and the effect of higher abatement taxes on
steady states is analysed. Section 3 studies the second-best optimal tax. In this section
we first characterize properties of the optimal tax function, and then study the dynamics
of the equilibrium trajectories. The final section concludes.
2 Model
We study a discrete time, t = 0, 1, . . ., overlapping generations model. In each period a
generation consisting of a continuum, normalized to measure one, of identical agents is
born. An agent born in period t lives for at most two periods: the period of birth and
can survive to old age with probability pit. A young agent supplies one unit of labour
inelastically receiving the wage wt which is used to finance current consumption, c
y
t and
savings for old age, st. Old agents have no labour endowment and live entirely off the
proceeds of their savings. Following the literature on uncertain lifetimes, we assume
that there is a perfect annuity market in which young agents buy annuities from perfectly
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competitive intermediaries who lend out the proceeds to firms for investment in productive
capital. Each unit of time t investment results in one unit of time t+1 capital, kt+1 which
becomes immediately available for production and fully depreciates in that period. Thus,
kt+1 = st (1)
At time t = 0, k0 is exogenously given.
The production function is constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas and can be expressed
in intensive form:
yt = Ak
α
t ;
where y is output per worker and k is capital per worker.
The gross returns to capital and labour rt and wt respectively, are equal to their marginal
products:
wt = (1− α)Akαt ; (2)
rt =
αA
k1−αt
. (3)
As a positive fraction of savers do not live into old age, the return on period t savings for
those who survive is rt+1/pit.
The production of final output creates a flow of pollutants proportional to gross output.
However, because population is normalised to unity, per-capita and gross quantities are
numerically identical so for notational consistency we use lower case z to denote pollution
flows and relate it to y, and write it as zt = γyt. The pollution we are modelling here
consists of PM10 and similar particulate matter and pollutants such as NOx which have
been linked to to health effects. Evidence shows that these pollutants are short-lived,
except in certain areas characterised by their geography and the nature of economic
activity, so that they can be treated as a flow (Varotsos et al. [2005], Windsor and Toumi
[2001], Zeka et al. [2005]).10
Environmental policy consists of a planner imposing an environmental tax, τt on the wage
incomes of the contemporaneous young,11 the proceeds of which are spent on operating
a clean-up technology that reduces the flow of pollutants. We assume that this technol-
ogy can only be operated by a central authority so that individual agents do not have
10This is different from the issue of greenhouse gas build-up that arises in the global warming literature.
In earlier versions of the paper, Goenka et. al. [2012] we show that allowing for persistence of pollution
does not affect results under some conditions.
11The reason for restricting the incidence of environmental taxes to the young generation is explained
in Section 3 where the optimal tax policy is derived.
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the means to abate privately.12 The efficiency of this technology is denoted by χ > 0,
and the reduction in pollution flows, is assumed to be a linear function of tax-financed
expenditures. Thus, the net flow of pollutants is:
zt = γyt − χτtwt;
which, after substituting for wt and redefining terms, simplifies to
zt = γ(1− ψτt)Akαt . (4)
where ψ = χ(1 − α)/γ. We assume ψ ∈ [0, 1] to avoid the possibility that as a result of
abatement, the flow of pollution is negative.
The probability of survival into old age is identical for all agents and is represented by a
twice continuously differentiable function of yt and zt. Longevity is increasing in per-capita
income and decreasing in pollution. If per-capita income is zero, the survival probability
is set to zero regardless of the stock of pollution and as the stock of pollution approaches
infinity, survival probability tends to zero regardless of the level of income.
Assumption 1
pit = pi(kt) = pi(y(kt), z(kt)); (5)
pi ∈ [0, 1], ∀y ≥ 0 & ∀z ≥ 0; (6)
∂pi
∂y
≡ piy(y, z) ≥ 0, ∀y > 0; (7)
∂pi
∂z
≡ piz(y, z) ≤ 0, ∀z > 0; (8)
pi(0, z) = 0, ∀z ≥ 0; (9)
pi(y,∞) = 0, ∀y ≥ 0. (10)
The only consequence of pollution in this model is that it creates a negative external
effect on expected lifetimes. Given the overlapping generations framework this externality
affects the young generation alone by affecting their expected lifetime utility. As only the
young work, the output is not affected by pollution directly. Thus, there is a potential
for welfare improvement by means of a tax on the young, the proceeds of which are spent
on abating pollution. Future generations are affected indirectly through the effects of
pollution on savings of the current generation, i.e. the next period’s capital stock.
12Some papers have considered private abatement in contexts in which the benefits of pollution abate-
ment are unambiguously positive, see John and Pecchenino [1994], John et. al. [1995], and Mariani et.
al. [2010]. In our model this is not the case, see Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
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In order to derive closed form solutions, we assume log-linear utility:13
Ut = lnc
y
t + pitlnc
o
t+1;
which the agent maximises subject to the life-cycle budget constraints:
cyt ≤ (1− τt)wt − st; (11)
cot+1 ≤
rt+1
pit
st; (12)
where cyt is consumption when young, st is the young agent’s savings and c
o
t+1 is ex post
consumption for an agent who survives into old-age.
Taking the first-order condition with respect to savings,
− 1
cyt
+
pit
cot+1
rt+1
pit
= 0;
and combining with equations (11), (12) and (3), results in the savings function:
st =
pit
1 + pit
A · (1− τt)(1− α)kαt .
2.1 Equilibrium
Using the market clearing condition, i.e. substituting into equation (1) we have:
kt+1 =
pit
1 + pit
A · (1− τt)(1− α)kαt . (13)
The path of the capital stock is traced out by recursive application of equation (13) from a
given k0 while the accompanying evolution of the flow of pollution follows from recursively
applying equation (4). The other variables are updated similarly.
2.2 Dynamics
We first characterize dynamics for a fixed, exogenous tax rate, τ . This will aid under-
standing the state-contingent tax policy.
A steady state is described by the following equations:
pi = pi(k) = pi(y(k), z(k)); (14)
k =
pi(k)
1 + pi(k)
A · (1− τ)(1− α)kα; (15)
z = γ(1− ψτ)Akα; (16)
y = Akα; (17)
13The qualitative results hold under more general specifications of CRRA utility functions.
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where pi, k, z and y denote steady state values of the respective variables. Equation (15)
can be written as
k = G(k);
where
G(k) =
pi(k)
1 + pi(k)
Γkα;
and Γ = A · (1− τ)(1− α) is a constant. Evaluating G(·) at k = 0,
G(0) =
0
1 + 0
Γ(0)α = 0;
implies a trivial steady state exists at k = 0.
If pi, the survival probability, were constant, then G(k) would represent a standard concave
neoclassical growth mapping, with G′(0) = ∞, G′′(k) < 0 ∀k, so that a unique interior
steady state exists and the dynamics would be globally stable. However, with endogenous
survival probability, other possibilities exist.
Lemma 1 limk↓0 pi′(k) <∞ is a sufficient condition for G′(0) = 0.
Proof :
See Appendix 1.
Lemma 1 establishes the possibility of multiple steady states. While it is stated in terms of
the reduced-form version of the survival probability, it is instructive to take into account
the chain of dependence of pi on y and z and through these variables, on k. Given the
Cobb-Douglas production function assumed throughout the paper, we can express pi′(k)
as:
pi′(k) = piy
y
k
+ piz
z
k
.
In order for the sufficient condition to hold, piy and piz should have exponents in k which
are large enough to offset the denominator. The following specialisation of Assumption 1
is sufficient to ensure this outcome, and we impose it from hereon:
Assumption 2
pit = pi((yt)
ϑ, (zt)
δ);
min{ϑ, δ} ≥ 1
α
.
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To establish existence of multiple interior steady states, the steady state equation can be
rearranged as follows:
Γ =
1 + pi(k)
pi(k)
k1−α.
Given the function pi(k) and any finite and positive value of k, the right-hand side will be
positive and finite. Since Γ is exogenous and positively related to A for τ < 1 and α < 1,
there always exists A large enough that
Γ >
1 + pi(k)
pi(k)
k1−α.
This leads to the following result, stated without proof:
Lemma 2 For any α ∈ (0, 1) and τ ∈ (0, 1) there exists an Aˆ < ∞ and a kˆ < ∞ and
associated Γˆ: Γˆ = (1 + pi(kˆ))/(pi(kˆ))kˆ1−α, such that Γ > Γˆ, G(Γ, kˆ) > kˆ.
Lemma 2 implies that so long as total factor productivity (TFP) is high enough (given a
function pi(k)), G(k) will exceed k for a non-empty interval of values of k. Along with the
results on the slope and level of G(k) derived earlier, this leads to the following proposition
Proposition 1 If TFP, A, is large enough, and Assumption 2 holds, then there are two
interior steady states, k∗` and k
∗
h, such that k
∗
` < kˆ < k
∗
h.
The higher steady state, k∗h has more capital and therefore more consumption as well as
a higher flow of pollution. Despite this, it offers a greater survival probability. In the
steady state, the survival probability is
pi(k) =
k1−α
Γ− k1−α ;
which is increasing in k.
Figure 1 below represents the phase diagram for this one-dimensional dynamic system,
depicting kt+1 as an S-shaped function of kt for a given tax rate, τ .
G(k) is S-shaped upwards, sharing its origin with the 45o line and intersecting it at two
other points k∗` , k
∗
h. Since, for points which lie between the origin and k
∗
` , G(k) lies below
the 45o line, any path starting off with k0 ∈ (0, k∗` ) will converge to the trivial steady
state, while for points between k∗` and k
∗
h, G(k) lies above the 45
o line, any path starting
off at k0 > k
∗
` will grow towards k
∗
h. k
∗
` represents a poverty trap not just in the sense
that it is the steady state with lower levels of economic activity and pollution flows, but
10
Figure 1: Multiple steady states
also in the sense that it represents a threshold below which the equilibrium path of the
economy converges asymptotically towards zero and is thus called the “poverty trap.” k∗h
resembles (locally) the steady state of a neoclassical growth model in the sense that G(k)
cuts the 45o line from above and, for this reason, we label it as a “neoclassical” steady
state.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows: as an economy starts off from a very
low level of capital, the negative effects of pollution on life expectancy are dominated by
the positive effects of income. This is what makes the transformation map G(k) slope
upward. Assumption A2 ensures that at low levels of capital, both effects are, however,
small so that longevity increases only gradually at first. Thus, changes in savings are also
dampened, making G(k) slope upward relatively slowly at low levels of capital. Along with
Lemma 2 and the associated restriction on the magnitude of TFP, this is what generates
multiple steady states. If the marginal effect of higher capital on longevity was infinitely
large at zero capital the poverty trap would disappear, but a neoclassical steady state
could still arise.
If G(k) slopes upward as it crosses the 45o line, then k∗h will be locally stable. At the
same time, the concavity of G(k) can lead to it to slope downward as it crosses the 45o
line. A necessary condition for this to happen is pi′(k) < 0, which can happen at high
enough values of k. This can lead to oscillations and limit cycles in the stock of capital
11
and the flow of pollution around the upper steady state.14 This result is consistent with
Palivos and Varvarigos [2017] who show that the negative effects of pollution on longevity
can lead to endogenous fluctuations.15 In our paper we extend this insight by showing
that optimal policy can generate cycles even when the underlying economy with arbitrary
abatement policy exhibits monotone convergence to the neoclassical steady state.
2.3 The effect of arbitrary tax policy
To understand the effect of an arbitrary abatement policy on growth, we differentiate
G(k), with respect to τ :
∂G(k)
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
k
=
[
− pi
1 + pi
− pizγψ(1− τ)Ak
α
(1 + pi)2
]
(1− α)Akα; (18)
where piz is the partial of pi with respect to z alone (the effect of k on z is accounted for
by the rest of the numerator in the second term). The above derivative is ambiguous in
sign because piz < 0. An increase in τ lowers net wage incomes, which at constant pi shifts
G(k) downwards. On the other hand, a higher τ raises pi via the abatement effect on z.
This tends to work against the downward shift in G(k). But the latter effect is weighted
by kα and is likely to be dominated by the direct effect of τ on wage income at low values
of k. Thus G(k) is likely to shift down at low levels of k but it might shift up at higher
levels.
Figure 2 maps the shift in G(k) in the context of a specific numerical example, details of
which are provided in Appendix 3. An increase in the exogenous abatement tax moves
both types of steady state to the right. The shift of the poverty trap widens the basin of
attraction for the trivial steady state, while the neoclassical steady state moves towards
higher capital. Note that in our example, the phase diagram associated with the original
tax rate is downward sloping at the neoclassical steady state indicating the presence of
oscillations.
14Note that G(k) cannot slope downwards at the low steady state, even if pi′(k) < 0.
15Seegmuller and Verche`re [2004] and Cao et. al. [2011] propose an alternate mechanism through which
pollution can lead to endogenous fluctuations, namely that the marginal disutility of pollution increases
with the stock of pollution.
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Figure 2: A uniform increase in an exogenous tax rate.
3 Optimal taxes
In this section we characterise the sequence of state-contingent, second-best taxes that
are imposed to fund pollution abatement. In choosing the sequence of optimal abatement
taxes to maximise the social planner maximises a weighted sum of lifetime utilities of each
generation born at time t + i, i ≥ 0, with 0 ≤ β < 1 representing the inter-generational
discount factor. The welfare function is
Wt = pit−1cot +
∞∑
i=0
βiUt+i;
where
Ut+i = lnc
y
t+i + pitlnc
o
t+i+1; i ≥ 0.
The planner imposes a sequence of wage taxes rates {τt+i}∞i=0 to maximise the above.
A wage tax is the natural policy instrument in the model. Ours is a one-sector model
which can be viewed as having only one choice variable for private agents, namely savings
for old age, because of the life-cycle budget constraint given by equations (11) and (12).
The only possible instruments are taxes on output, capital and wages.16 An output tax,
16We do not have a ‘dirty’ sector which could be taxed to fund transfers to a ‘green’ sector; neither do
our agents have access to technologies that might offset pollution. So the type of Pigouvian taxes that
can tilt incentives towards green activities are not available in our model. Some of the related papers
in the literature, e.g. John and Pecchenino [1994], Mariani et. al. [2010] consider private abatement
13
because of constant returns to scale, amounts to a uniform tax on wage and capital
incomes. Taxing capital incomes is problematic as it makes the old in the initial period
worse off and introduces an inter-generational conflict where there is none. Hence, only
wage taxes have the potential to be weakly welfare-increasing, albeit in a second-best way
because of their effects on savings. Likewise, the planner is constrained to non-negative
tax rates as any subsidy to the current young can only come at the expense of the current
old.
Since the planner’s policies are, by construction, welfare-neutral with respect to the sur-
viving old at time t, we confine our attention to a truncated welfare function W˜t that
excludes time t old. It is well known that in the absence of viable commitment strategies,
the path of optimal taxes in an overlapping-generations economy may be time-inconsistent
(Erosa and Gervais [2001]). To avoid this, we use dynamic programming to formulate each
period’s policy choice as a function of the state of the economy.
W˜t = V (kt) = maxτt [Ut + βV (kt+1)] .
Plugging in private decisions regarding cyt , c
o
t+1 and kt+1 from equations (11), (12) and
(13) respectively into the objective function, we have
V (kt) = maxτt
[
ln
(
(1− τt)(1− α)Akαt
1 + pi(kt)
)
+ pi(kt)ln
(
Aˆ(1− τt)αk2αt
pi(kt)1−α(1 + pi(kt))α
)
+ βV (kt+1)
]
;
(19)
where Aˆ ≡ α(1− α)αA1+α is a constant. Taking the first-order condition:
∂Vt
∂τt
= Ωt
∂pit
∂τt
− 1 + αpit
1− τt + β
∂Vt+1
∂kt+1
∂kt+1
∂τt
≤ 0; (20)
where
Ωt = lnc
o
t+1 −
2− α + pit
1 + pit
;
when equation (20) is < 0 implies a zero tax. Next, taking the derivative ∂Vt/∂kt of the
value function at time t and updating it by one period, we get
∂Vt+1
∂kt+1
=
α(1 + 2pit+1)
kt+1
+ Ωt+1
∂pit+1
∂kt+1
.
Finally taking into account the dependence of kt+1 on τt via equation (13),
∂kt+1
∂τt
=
A(1− α)kαt
1 + pit
[(
1− τt
1 + pit
)
∂pit
∂τt
− pit
]
.
activity. This is not applicable in our model since the pollution externality arising from agents’ savings
decisions is passed on to agents not alive at the time the decisions are made. It should also be noted
that in their papers, it is always welfare-improving to tax polluting activities and encourage abatement
but in our model, reducing pollution may not improve welfare, given the dual external determinants of
mortality.
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Putting everything together we can express the first-order condition as
∂Vt
∂τt
= Ωt
∂pit
∂τt
− 1 + αpit
1− τt +β
[
α(1 + 2pit+1)
kt+1
+ Ωt+1
∂pit+1
∂kt+1
] [
A(1− α)kαt
1 + pit
{(
1− τt
1 + pit
)
∂pit
∂τt
− pit
}]
.
(21)
The terms in equation (21) represent the following effects: (i) the direct effects of a
tax on the wage income of the current young, (ii) the indirect effects working through
induced changes in survival probability and (iii) the intergenerational spillover induced
by the effect of current taxes on the capital stock available to the next generation’s young
workers. The direct effects reduce both consumption and savings by the young, and are
negative. These are captured by the second term in the optimality condition.
The indirect effects are captured by the first term, Ωt. An environmental tax raises
survival probability, leading to higher expected utility in old age. At the same time the
higher survival probability reduces actual consumption at both young and old age, the
first because savings are increasing in survival probability; the second because although
individuals save more the return to their annuities yields less because of the higher survival
rate of the population. This effect can be confirmed from equation (19) in which the term
capturing the optimal old-age consumption decreases in pi. The intuition is that while
per-capita old-age capital increases by a factor of [pi/(1 + pi)]α, the market return on a
unit annuity decreases by a factor 1/pi.
Finally, the intergenerational effect depends on a combination of three factors: the effect
of a current abatement tax on capital stock in the next period; the effect of a higher
capital stock next period on the lifetime utility of the next generation and the magnitude
of the intergenerational discount factor. The first two of these effects are both ambiguous,
consisting themselves of further sub-effects, but whatever their sign, their magnitude is
proportional to the intergenerational discount factor β.
Before proceeding to further disentangle these effects we shall first consider the case of
β = 0: this is the case of a myopic government concerned only with the welfare of a single
contemporaneous generation. This is a benchmark case which yields tractable results that
are extended to the general case.
3.1 Myopic social planner:
When β = 0, first-order condition, equation (20), reduces to
dVt
dτt
≡ H(kt, τt) =
[
lncot+1 −
2− α + pit
1 + pit
]
· ∂pit
∂τt
− 1 + αpit
1− τt ≤ 0; (22)
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when equation (22) is < 0 this implies τt = 0.
With some further manipulations to be described below, the above condition will underly
a policy function, τt = h(kt). Substituting the solution into equation (13) for capital
accumulation yields kt+1 = G(kt, h(kt)). The dynamic path of the economy is traced out
by repeated iteration of the above. A steady state of the economy with optimal taxes is
given by a pair k and τ = h(k) such that k = G(k, h(k)).
Proposition 2 If k0 is below some threshold level k, then the optimal environmental tax,
τ ∗ = 0.
Proof : From (22) we see that a necessary condition for τ ∗ > 0 is
Ωt =
[
lncot+1 −
2− α + pit
1 + pit
]
> 0.
At low levels of initial capital, k0, this is not going to hold. This is because the negative
term in Ωt is always non-zero while the positive term approaches minus infinity, given the
logarithmic specification, as the capital stock approaches zero. Thus there exists some
threshold level k; such that for any k0 < k, Ω < 0.
An optimal tax-financed abatement policy trades off less consumption for agents when
they are young in exchange for higher life expectancy. But as we noted in the discussion
following equation (21), an increase in life expectancy does not necessarily increase old-
age utility: while the higher survival probability increases expected utility at given levels
of old-age consumption, it also lowers the return on per-capita savings and this leads, blue
all else equal, to a decline in per-capita old-age consumption. At low levels of capital,
these indirect effects dominate as old consumption is low and the fall in return of per-
capita savings outweighs the increase in expected utility due to the change in probability
of survival for the given level of savings. For higher levels of capital, when old age
consumption is higher, the increase in expected utility through increase in probability of
survival will outweigh the decrease due to decrease in savings
Pursuing this intuition further, we expect that once a critical level of capital has been
reached such that the optimal tax becomes positive, any further increase in the capital
stock will lead to higher taxes. This is because the benefits from higher survival probability
are likely to rise faster than costs associated with it. Thus, starting from an initial
situation in which the first-order condition for taxes holds with equality, a small increase
in kt will tend to increase the benefit from higher taxes relative to the costs, necessitating
an increase in the tax rate.
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We begin by studying the behaviour of Ω. In principle, there will be an arbitrarily high
level of kt such that Ωt > 0. This is because the first term in Ωt has the potential to
increase monotonically with kt, at least after some threshold, while the second term is
always bounded in the interval [(3 − α)/2, (2 − α)] and within this interval, it falls as
pit increases. c
o
t+1 rises monotonically with kt even when pit rises as well. If along the
dynamic path, the detrimental effects of pollution make pit start declining in kt, then c
o
t+1
rises even faster with kt. At some level of development, Ωt will be positive and increasing
in capital. The other negative term in the first-order condition is similarly bounded
above at (1 + α), when evaluated at a zero tax rate. Thus, at a second critical level of
development, an interior solution will arise for a positive optimal tax. The question is
what level of development has to be reached before it arises and to what extent this level
coincides with potential steady states of the economy.
To pursue these conjectures more rigorously, we first establish some general conditions for
the applicability of a positive environmental tax at some threshold level of income. Let
the right-hand side of equation (22) be denoted by:
H(kt, τt) = Ωt · ∂pit
∂τt
− 1 + αpit
1− τt .
The first condition needed for a well-behaved tax function is
∂H
∂τt
∣∣∣∣
H=0
< 0.
In other words, the second-order condition is satisfied whenever the first-order condition
holds as an equality.
The second condition ensuring a well-behaved tax function is:
∂H
∂kt
∣∣∣∣
τ=0,H=0
> 0.
Thus, evaluated at the point where the first-order condition first holds with equality at
a zero tax, it is upward sloping in kt. Note that at very low levels of the capital stock
this may not be true, but what is required is that it holds in the neighbourhood of the
threshold where an optimal tax first arises.
To explore the above conditions further, differentiate H with respect to its arguments (time
scripts will be suppressed as all variables are contemporaneous). After some manipulation,
these derivatives can be written as
∂H
∂τ
= Ω
∂2pi
∂τ 2
− 2α
1− τ
∂pi
∂τ
− 1 + αpi
(1− τ)2 −
pi(1 + pi) + (1− α)
pi(1 + pi)2
(
∂pi
∂τ
)2
; (23)
∂H
∂k
=
∂Ω
∂k
∂pi
∂τ
+ Ω
∂2pi
∂τ∂k
− α
1− τ
∂pi
∂k
; (24)
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where
∂Ω
∂k
=
2α
k
− (1 + pi)
2 − pi − α
(1 + pi)2
νpik;
where νpik is the elasticity of survival probability with respect to capital. This is eventually
decreasing in k due to the positive and eventually diminishing effects of greater income
and the negative and eventually increasing effects of higher pollution. It can turn negative
at some point; however, we shall restrict our analysis to cases where it remains strictly
positive.
None of the above terms can be signed unambiguously but two comments are in order.
First, as noted before, a positive effect of k on Ω is necessary for the first-order condition
to eventually hold. What this in turn requires is that along the infra-marginal path of
capital, i.e. before the first-order condition kicks in, there is some range of values of
k where the elasticity of survival probability with respect to the capital stock (taking
into account both the beneficial and detrimental effects) is sufficiently small. As noted
above, this elasticity will eventually diminish with growth in the capital stock, implying
the existence of a threshold value of capital after which ∂Ω/∂k > 0.
Proposition 3 There exists k˜ > 0, such that for all k > k˜,
∂Ω
∂k
> 0.
From hereon we neglect consideration of values of k below this threshold, as for the
purposes of deriving an environmental tax, such values of k cannot admit positive solutions
of τ . Second, a sufficient condition for the second-order condition for τ to be negative is
that pi is concave in τ . However, this is likely to be too restrictive, given the following
relationship between the second-order derivatives of pi with respect to τ and z:
∂2pi
∂τ 2
= (ψγAkα)2
∂2pi
∂z2
.
Thus, pi will be concave in τ if and only if it is downwards concave in z. But given the likely
impact of pollution levels on survival probability, this portion of the pi − z relationship
applies at lower levels of pollution, when it is less likely that the first-order condition for
an optimal tax will hold as an equality. At higher levels, it is unlikely that pi is concave
in τ . This rules out imposing concavity on the pi− τ relationship as a sufficient condition
for ensuring the validity of the second-order condition.
To proceed further, we turn to the specific example of the survival probability assumed
earlier.
pi = piApiB =
[
yϑ
1 + yϑ
] [
1
1 + zδ
]
.
In the following subsections we first analyse the sign of ∂2pi/∂τ 2 and then the sign of
∂2pi/(∂τ∂k)
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3.1.1 The second-order condition, ∂H/∂τ
The following expressions are derived for the specific functional form for pi (time scripts
are again suppressed).
∂pi
∂τ
= piA
ψδγAkαzδ−1
(1 + zδ)2
> 0; (25)
∂2pi
∂τ 2
= piA
(ψγAkα)2δzδ−2
(1 + zδ)3
[
(δ + 1)zδ − (δ − 1)] .
By comparing the two expressions, the latter can be written as
∂2pi
∂τ 2
= piA
(
ψγAkαδ
z(1 + zδ)
· ∂pi
∂τ
)[
(δ + 1)zδ − (δ − 1)]

>
=
<
 0 as zδ

>
=
<
 δ − 1δ + 1; (26)
confirming the dependence of the sign of ∂2pi/∂τ 2 on that of ∂2pi/∂z2. To proceed further
with an analysis of the second-order condition, i.e. equation (23), note from equation (4)
that:
γAkαt =
zt
1− ψτt .
Suppressing time subscripts, let us write this as
γAkα =
z
1− ψτ .
Then (26) can be further modified:
∂2pi
∂τ 2
= piA
(
ψδz
z(1− ψτ)(1 + zδ) ·
∂pi
∂τ
)[
(δ + 1)zδ − (δ − 1)] .
Now, from equation (22),
Ω ≤ 1 + αpi
1− τ
1
∂pi/∂τ
, ∀ τ.
Thus, taking the term involving ∂2pi/∂τ 2 in equation (23),
Ω
∂2pi
∂τ 2
≤
(
1 + αpi
1− τ
ψδz
z(1− ψτ)(1 + zδ)
)[
(δ + 1)zδ − (δ − 1)] .
Combining with one of the other terms in equation (23)
Ω
∂2pi
∂τ 2
− 1 + αpi
(1− τ)2 ≤
[
1 + αpi
1− τ
][
ψδz − [(δ + 1)zδ − (δ − 1)]
z(1− ψτ)(1 + zδ) −
1
1− τ
]
. (27)
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The sign of the above term will depend on the sign of the term inside square brackets.
After some manipulation, the sign of the latter can be shown to be negative if the following
holds:
− [1− ψ{1 + δ(1− τ)}]z
δ
(1− ψτ)(1 + zδ)(1− τ) < 0.
A sufficient condition for the above term to be negative for all values of endogenous
variables is ψ < 1/(1 + δ).17
We have therefore established:
Lemma 3 A sufficient condition for ∂H/∂τ to be negative at all values of endogenous
variables and along the entire dynamic path is ψ < 1/(1 + δ).
Recall that ψ =
χ(1− α)
γ
, where χ is the effectiveness of the abatement technology and
γ is how polluting the productive activity. As we would expect, if the first is low enough
and/or the second high enough, then the second order condition holds, or in other words
there is an interior solution.
3.1.2 The sign of ∂H/∂k
Note the following derivatives for the assumed functional form (time indices continue to
be suppressed):
∂piA
∂k
=
α
k
ϑyϑ
(1 + yϑ)2
;
∂piB
∂k
= −αγ(1− ψτ)Ak
α
k
δzδ−1
(1 + zδ)2
.
Using the definitions of piA, piB, and pi, and rearranging, we can combine the above
derivatives
∂pi
∂k
=
αpi
k
[
ϑyϑ
(1 + yϑ)yϑ
− δz
δ
(1 + zδ)
]
; (28)
which implies that
νpik = α
[
ϑyϑ
(1 + yϑ)yϑ
− δz
δ
(1 + zδ)
]
17By extending the comparison with the sign of Ω·∂2pi/∂τ2 to other terms in the expression for ∂2H/∂τ2
even weaker conditions can be derived. But as with the above, to ensure negativity of the second-order
condition for all admissible values of endogenous variables, the above condition still applies.
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where νpik has been defined as the elasticity of pi with respect to k.
18
Now, to derive the sign of ∂2H/(∂τ∂k), we proceed in two steps. We first derive an
expression for ∂2pi/(∂τ∂k) and then use it to evaluate the sign of ∂2H/(∂τ∂k).
The first step is accomplished by taking the total derivative of ∂pi/∂τ , equation (25), with
respect to k. After imposing some definitions and equalities, and rearranging terms, it
can be shown that:
k
∂pi/∂τ
∂2pi
∂τ∂k
= νpik + αδ
z
z(1 + zδ)
> 0.
The full derivation is outlined in Appendix 3. From here it is easy to establish the
following:
Lemma 4 H(k, τ) = 0 =⇒ ∂H/∂k ≥ 0.
Proof : First, the expression for ∂2pi/∂τ∂k implies that
∂2pi
∂τ∂k
≥ ∂pi
∂τ
1
k
νpik.
Second, H = 0 implies that
Ω =
1 + αpi
1− τ
1
∂pi/∂τ
.
Therefore, referring to equation (24),
Ω
∂2pi
∂τ∂k
=
1 + αpi
1− τ
1
∂pi/∂τ
∂2pi
∂τ∂k
≥ 1 + αpi
1− τ
1
k
νpik.
Now, referring to the negative term in equation (24),
α
(1− τ)
∂pi
∂k
=
αpi
(1− τ)kντk.
Combining the two terms in equation (24),
Ω
∂2pi
∂τ∂k
− αpi
(1− τ)kνpik ≥
1 + αpi
1− τ
1
k
νpik − αpi
(1− τ)kνpik ≥
1
(1− τ)kνpik ≥ 0
.
Note that we have derived the above result for all values of τ . Thus, as an economy’s
capital stock increases, the slack in H diminishes until finally an interior solution is reached.
18Throughout the analysis, we assume that νpik remains positive, although as we have noted before,
a negative value is entirely possible under some conditions, and if it happens there can be oscillations
around the high steady state.
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3.1.3 Positive taxes:
We can now establish:
Proposition 4 If ψ <
1
1 + δ
and k ≥ k˜ then, there (i) exists an optimal policy function,
τ = h(k), h : [k˜,∞) −→ [0, 1]; (ii) h(k) is (weakly) increasing in k.
Proof : The first part follows from the strict monotonicity of H in both τ and k. Since
H is strictly decreasing in τ for all k under the assumed conditions, then for any k in the
relevant interval, either (i) H(k, 0) ≤ 0, or (ii) H(k, 1) > 0 or (iii) H(k, τ) = 0 for some
τ ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, τ uniquely solves the relevant case for H at given k, because for any
τ ′ > τ , in case (i) τ = 0 and τ ′ > 0 worsens the slack in H; in case (ii) if τ = 1 then τ ′ lies
outside the unit interval and in case (iii) since H(τ, k) = 0 for τ ∈ [0, 1], then H(τ ′, k) < 0.
Similar argument rules out the possibility that τ ′ < τ also solves H for a given k.
The second part follows from
∂h(k)
∂k
∣∣∣∣
H=0
= −Hk
Hτ
≥ 0;
while ∀k ∈ [k˜,∞), H(0, k) < 0⇒ h(k) = 0 and H(1, k) > 0⇒ h(k) = 1.
To understand why h(k) is (weakly) increasing after a threshold has been passed, recall
the first-order condition, equation (22), which we have denoted as H(kt, τt). Lemma 3
established that the second order condition is satisfied, i.e. ∂Ht/∂τt < 0, so long as the
abatement technology is not too powerful in abating pollution (low χ). In Lemma 4, we
established that, starting from any point at which Ht = 0, i.e. the first-order condition
holds as an equality, ∂Ht/∂kt > 0, implying that a small increase in k starting from an
initial optimum will induce some slack in the first order condition.
The intuition for this is that once the capital stock is high enough that the first-order
condition binds, a further increment to the capital stock (at the initial tax rate) will raise
the expected utility from given old-age consumption because of higher survival probability,
by at least as much as it decreases utility from lower young-age consumption due to higher
savings and from old-age consumption due to lower per-capita returns on savings. Thus
higher capital increases the net benefit from taxing pollution, and this induces an increase
in the optimal tax rate via the second-order condition.
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3.2 Long-lived social planner:
We look at the continuation utility of future generations in the first-order condition (20)
for determining the optimal tax on the current generation:
β
[
α(1 + 2pit+1)
kt+1
+ Ωt+1
∂pit+1
∂kt+1
] [
A(1− α)kαt
1 + pit
{(
1− τt
1 + pit
)
∂pit
∂τt
− pit
}]
.
The term in second square brackets represents the effect of a higher current tax on next
period’s capital stock. A necessary condition for this to be positive is that the tax-financed
increase in abatement activity increases the survival probability for the current young by
enough to offset the negative income effect of the higher tax. The term in the first square
brackets represents the effect of a higher stock of capital next period on the welfare of the
next generation. That in turn depends in part on the effect of the higher capital stock
on the survival probability of next period’s young. Even if that is positive, the overall
effect on their welfare might not be because of the term Ωt+1 which could be negative at
low initial values of capital, for similar reasons as were identified in the case of Ωt: higher
survival probability raises the utility from given old-age consumption but lowers both
young-age and old-age consumption levels; thus if the initial level of old-age consumption
is low this contributes a negative effect. This discussion indicates that it will be difficult
to assign a sign to the inter-generational effect on current optimal taxation on an a priori
basis.
Since we have already derived using analytical methods a well-behaved tax policy function
without incorporating the inter-generational effect and our main aim is to verify the intu-
ition outlined above for how incorporating such effects might modify the policy function
we proceed by way of numerical examples which map the policy function at varying levels
of the steady state capital stock.
We start by defining the steady state version of the optimal tax equation[
Ω
∂pi
∂τ
− 1 + αpi
1− τ
]
+ β
[
α(1 + 2pi)
k
+ Ω
∂pi
∂τ
] [
A(1− α)kα
1 + pi
{(
1− τ
1 + pi
)
∂pi
∂k
− pi
}]
≤ 0; (29)
(when equation (29) is < 0 implies τ = 0) where ∂pi/∂τ is given by equation (25) and
∂pi/∂k is given by equation (28).
MATLAB was used to trace out the policy function. Taking an interval of values of steady
state capital, k, equation (29) was recursively solved for the optimal value of the steady
state abatement tax, τ at varying levels of the inter-generational discount factor, β. The
results are in Figure 3.2.19 Other parameter values were set as in Figure 2.
19For β=0.2, MATLAB could not solve for the optimal tax in certain regions of parameter space because
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Figure 3: The policy function.
We can see that the qualitative properties of the policy function are as hypothesised: at
any value of β, the optimal tax is zero at sufficiently low levels of k. As k rises, an upward
sloping and concave tax emerges. The main effect of higher β is to shift the policy function
upwards so that at any level of k the planner is more likely to undertake active abatement
and to set a higher tax if positive. This is line with conventional wisdom regarding the
effect of far-sighted environmental policy.
At the same time, in our model, the reaction of the capital stock to taxes can reflect the
underlying non-convexities of this economy. We have seen in Section 3.1 that, at any
arbitrary tax, there can be multiple steady states and that an increase in the abatement
tax rate can have ambiguous effects on the steady state capital stock. It is the interaction
of state-contingent environmental policy with the behaviour of the capital stock that can
introduce non-linearities and change the dynamics.
of the highly nonlinear nature of equation (29). Hence for β = 0.2, the policy function does not intersect
the capital axis at τ = 0 but this was not an issue for β=0.1 or 0.
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3.3 Dynamics of the optimal tax
A steady state with optimal taxation is characterised by two equations.
k =
pi(k, τ)
1 + pi(k, τ)
A · (1− τ)(1− α)kα; (30)
τ = h(k); (31)
where equation (30) represents the steady state reaction function of private agents and
equation (31) represents the steady state policy function of the social planner. We assume
that h(k) satisfies Proposition 4 for both a myopic and a long-lived social planner. A
solution to the above equations is represented by a pair (k∗, τ ∗).
The dynamics of the economy with optimal taxes are traced out by recursive application
of the tax policy function and the phase diagram for the capital stock. For any capital
kt > k˜, τt = h(kt). Then, next period’s capital stock follows:
kt+1 =
pi(kt, τt)
1 + pi(kt, τt)
A(1− τt)(1− α)kαt = G(kt, τt);
and so on.
This represents a first-order difference equation in kt for any arbitrary k0. Linearising
around a steady state, the local dynamics are determined by the sign and magnitude of
the expression
dkt+1
dkt
= G1(k
∗, τ ∗) + G2(k∗, τ ∗)h′(k∗); (32)
where G1(k, τ) = G
′(k), as given by equation (34) and G2(k, τ) is given by equation (18;
see Appendix 2).
It is instructive to compare equation (32) with the case of exogenous abatement, in which
dkt+1
dkt
= G′(k∗).
In this case, the dynamics of the capital stock are driven by a non-time varying G(k)
function for a given τ . In the case of optimal abatement, the G function shifts (in (kt+1, kt)
space) each period as the tax varies along the optimal path. This generates the possibility
of additional dynamic complexity arising from a dynamic tax policy. To rule out any
further complexity in the exogenous-tax case, we assume that G1(k, τ) > 0 throughout
this section.
Define k∗ = g(τ), as the value of of k∗ which solves equation (30) for any admissible τ .
Then τ ∗ = h(k∗) solves the optimal tax at this steady state.
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It is easy to show that
g′(τ) =
G2(k
∗, τ)
1− G1(k∗, τ) .
Using the above, equation (32) can be expressed as:
dkt+1
dkt
= G1(k
∗, τ ∗) + g′(τ ∗)(1− G1(k∗, τ ∗))h′(k∗); (33)
where the sign of g′(τ ∗) is the same as (resp. the opposite of) the sign of G2(k∗, τ2), when
1− G1(k∗, τ ∗) > 0 (resp. < 0), as in the neoclassical steady state (resp. as in the poverty
trap).
We now examine the local dynamics, first at a neoclassical steady state and then at a
poverty trap. In the next sub-section, we shall use a graphical approach to study local
dynamics but since our diagrams will involve multiple steady states we shall use ∗ to
denote a steady state only if the diagram shows a single steady state; otherwise other
indices will be used.
3.3.1 Local dynamics around a neoclassical steady state
In this case, G1(k, τ) < 1, 1 − G1(k, τ) > 0. Then g′(τ) > 0 (resp. < 0) as G2(k, τ) > 0
(resp. < 0). By suitable rearrangement of equation (33), it can be shown that
dkt+1
dkt

> 1
∈ [0, 1]
< 0
 as g′(τ)h′(k)

> 1
∈
[
− G1(k,τ)
1−G1(k,τ) , 1
]
< − G1(k,τ)
1−G1(k,τ)
 .
We can see that the local dynamics around a neoclassical steady state are no longer
necessarily convergent, as was the case in the exogenous tax economy. They will depend
on two factors: (i) whether g′(τ) is positive or negative, i.e. whether an increase in the
tax rate shifts the neoclassical steady state up or down; (ii) the slope of g(τ) relative to
the slopes of the other two main steady state relationships: h(k∗) and G1(k∗, τ ∗) .
Whether g′(τ) is negative or positive, but its magnitude is not too large, the dynamic
path converges monotonically. When g′(τ) is positive and relatively large, the steady
state becomes a source. When g′(τ) is negative and relatively large, fluctuations can arise
near the steady state.
Figure 4 represents the dynamics near a “well-behaved” neoclassical steady state, i.e.
one in which an increase in the tax rate shifts the phase diagram G.(k) downwards at the
steady state. This case is considered first as it helps outline the graphical approach that
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Figure 4: A well-behaved neoclassical steady state
k0
k*
kt , k*k1 k2 k*
kt+1 , k*
t
t*
t2
t1
h(k)g(t)
g(0)
g(t1)
g(t2)g(t*)
g(t1)
will be used in what follows. The top panel of Figure 4 shows a family of phase diagrams
relating kt+1 to kt. These maps are drawn to display local, rather than global, dynamics
so we do not depict them starting from the origin. Each map is underpinned by a specific
value of the tax, τt. The lower panel depicts the functions g(τ) and h(k) in (τ − k) space.
h(k) is always upward sloping in this space while, in keeping with the assumed nature of
this steady state, g(τ) is downward sloping. Their intersection gives the combination of
steady state capital and steady state taxes, (τ ∗, k∗). This is the unique long-run steady
state.
Starting at k0 < k, the latter defined in Proposition 2 as the minimum level of capital
associated with active environmental policy, the optimal tax at t = 0 is τ0 = 0. The
steady state associated with this tax is the highest dashed phase diagram on the top
panel, which is labeled G(0). If the tax rate was held constant at this level, the capital
stock would evolve monotonically towards k = g(0) through iterative application of this
map. At t = 0, next period’s capital, k1, is given by the vertical projection to this map
from k0. But when the economy reaches k1, the optimal tax for that period no longer
equals zero. Indeed, as drawn, the threshold level of capital is crossed and optimal τ1 > 0,
as given by the projection down from k1 to h(k). At τ1, the horizontal projection to g(τ)
gives the new steady state level of capital associated with a tax rate, τ1. This means that
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the phase diagram in the upper panel shifts downwards so it intersects the 45o line at
g(τ1). The vertical projection from k1 to the new phase diagram gives k2 and so on. The
dynamics are monotonically convergent with both kt and τt rising in ever shorter steps
towards the steady state.
Figure 5 shows the more interesting case of multiple neoclassical steady states.20 Since
the policy function h(k) is always upward sloping in k − τ space, for multiple neoclas-
sical steady states to arise, g(τ) also has to be positively sloped at some point, i.e. the
steady state capital stock increases with greater abatement taxes. In addition, as drawn,
g′(τ)h′(k) > 1 so that the combined effect of an optimal tax that increases in the capital
stock and the feedback from a higher tax to a higher steady state capital stock is rela-
tively strong. We see that three steady states arise in this case, one with zero optimal
abatement (A) and two with positive abatement (B and C). Since G′(k) cuts the 45o line
from above in each of the steady states, all three are of the type that we have designated
as neoclassical. This contrasts with the case of an exogenous abatement tax where there
can be at most one neoclassical steady state.
We consider dynamics near the middle steady state, B. Graphically, both g(τ) and h(k)
slope upwards in (τ − k) space and h(k) cuts g(τ) from above at this steady state; hence,
for any initial k0 > kB (as shown in the diagram), g(τ0) > k0. And since each potential
steady state for a given tax rate is locally stable, k1 > k0 so that the economy moves away
from kB, i.e. B is unstable.
To understand better the possibility of multiple neoclassical states under optimal abate-
ment, note that steady state A arises because the k-axis intercept of g(τ) lies to the left
of that of h(k). Given the relative slopes of g(τ) and h(k), it can be seen that if g(τ)
intersected the k-axis to the right of h(k) then both A and B would disappear and only
the stable steady state C would be possible. In this sense, the existence of a neoclassical
steady state with optimally zero abatement appears to be a pre-condition for multiple
neoclassical steady states with optimally positive abatement to emerge . We shall observe
a similar feature in the context of multiple poverty traps in Figure 8.
Figure 6 below illustrates a parametrized example of the multiplicity depicted above. It
was computed using MATLAB and the same parameter values as the ones that generated
Figure 2, with the addition of the intergenerational discount factor β which is set at
0.9. In Figure 6, there is a no-abatement steady state at kn0 = 0.118 and two positive
abatement steady states with (τ1 = 0.065, kn1 = 0.124) and (τ2 = 0.185, kn2 = 0.1422)
20In depicting this case graphically we continue making the assumption that under arbitrarily constant
taxation, there would be only a single steady state of the neoclassical type.
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Figure 5: Multiple neoclassical steady states.
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respectively. Given the respective slopes of the tax policy and capital reaction functions,
the steady state Kn1 is unstable and the other two are stable.
Figure 7 shows the case when g′(τ) < 0 and its magnitude is relatively large. Note that
a large magnitude of g′(τ) implies that its diagrammatic representation in the bottom
panel of Figure 7, makes it appear relatively flat. As drawn, Figure 7 shows the dynamic
path starting at k0 cycling between the pair (τ0, k0) and (τ1, k1). This happens a large
magnitude of g′(τ) implies one or both of: (i) steady state capital is quite sensitive to
changes in the tax rate, i.e. a small increase in the tax rate lowers the capital stock by a
large amount, (ii) starting from an initial capital stock in the neighbourhood of the steady
state the rate of convergence towards that steady state is high, i.e. there is a large jump
in the next period’s capital stock in the direction of the steady state.21
These two effects reinforce each other to produce a cycle. In Figure 7, there is a unique
steady state (k∗, τ ∗) at the point where g(τ) and h(k) intersect. The economy starts at a
capital stock, k0 that lies below k
∗. Given k0, the optimal tax rate is τ0 and in the upper
panel of Figure 7, the dynamics of the capital stock are governed by the phase diagram,
21In technical terms, a large magnitude for g′(τ) can arise either because G2(k, τ) is large in magnitude
or because G1(k, τ) is large, or both. The first suggests possibility (i) and the second suggests possibility
(ii).
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Figure 6: Multiple neoclassical steady states, β = 0.9.
G(τ0), associated with τ0. As we can see, the capital stock jumps to k1 which is greater
than k∗. At k1, the tax rate increases from τ0 to τ1 leading to a new phase diagram, G(τ1).
Since the steady state associated with G(τ1) lies below k1, next period’s capital moves
towards that steady state in a large step, bringing the economy back to k0. As drawn,
the cycle is locally stable but this is not necessarily going to be the case. The point is
that oscillations can arise if these features are present.
We summarise these results under the following Proposition, stated without further proof.
Proposition 5 Suppose there exists a neoclassical steady state (k, τ) in an economy with
optimal taxation. Then, given G1(k, τ) < 1 and (1− G1(k, τ1)) > 0,
(i) the steady state will be locally unstable if g′(τ)h′(k) > 1;
(ii) there will be local fluctuations around the steady state if
g′(τ)h′(k) < −{G1(k, τ)/(1− G1(k, τ)} < 0
(iii) the dynamics will be monotonically convergent if
−{G1(k, τ)/(1− G1(k, τ)} < g′(τ)h′(k) < 0
.
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Figure 7: Oscillations around a neoclassical steady state.
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3.3.2 Local dynamics around a poverty trap:
In this case of a poverty trap, the phase diagram cuts the 45o line from below; therefore
G1(k, τ) > 1 and 1− G1(k, τ) < 0. Thus g′(τ) > 0 (resp. < 0) as G2(k, τ) < 0 (resp. > 0).
To remain consistent with the discussion following equation (18) in Section 3, we shall
exclude the case g′(τ) < 0 from further consideration. Thus, equation (33) can be written
more clearly as
dkt+1
dkt
= G1(k, τ)− g′(τ)(G1(k, τ)− 1)h′(k).
It can now be established by suitable rearrangement that22
dkt+1
dkt

> 1
∈ [0, 1]
< 0
 as g′(τ)h′(k)

< 1
∈
[
1, G1(k,τ)
G1(k,τ)−1
]
> G1(k
∗,τ∗)
G1(k∗,τ∗)−1
 .
Whereas a poverty trap was monotonically a source in the case of exogenous taxes, it can
now be a sink. There can also be fluctuations around the poverty trap, depending on how
strong the interaction of optimal policy with private sector capital accumulation decisions
is.
22It is implicit in the above that for any variable x > 1, x/(x− 1)→ 1 from above as x→∞.
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Figure 8: A locally stable poverty trap
Figure 8 shows the case of two poverty traps one of which (steady state A) has zero taxes
and is unstable while the other (steady state B) has positive taxes and is stable.23 In
this case, h′(k)g′(τ) > 1, so that as k increases h(k) cuts g(τ) from above in the lower
panel. As in the neoclassical case, h(k) is increasing and there is a steady state with no
abatement, A, which in this case is locally unstable and a poverty trap as G′ > 1. Also
note that if g(τ) cut the k-axis to the right of of h(k), then neither A nor B would arise.
As in the case of multiple neoclassical steady states, this again reflects the necessity of
there being a no-abatement poverty trap steady state for there to be another poverty trap
with positive abatement.
Consider now the dynamics near B. Starting at an initial capital, k0 < kB and tax rate
τ0 < τB, the phase diagram associated with τ0 would result in a steady state g(τ0) which
lies below k0. Because G(τ0) is, for constant τ , unstable, this means that k1 > k0. Then
τ1 > τ0 and g(τ1) lies above g(τ0) but below k1. Thus k2 > k1, τ2 > τ1 and the economy
is on a path that converges to (τB, kB).
Intuitively Figure 8 depicts a case in which abatement taxes become optimal only at a
relatively high level of capital but are subsequently fairly sensitive to increases in capital.
This results in h(k) cutting g(τ) from above. When the initial capital stock is below
the steady state, the optimal tax rate associated with that capital stock maps into an
23Again, we depict only local dynamics so the neoclassical steady state associated with this economy
is not stated.
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Figure 9: Cycles around a poverty trap.
associated (transitory) steady state which lies below the initial capital stock. This results
in next period’s capital stock being higher than the initial one and closer to the long-run
steady state.
Finally, the possibility of cycles around a poverty trap is illustrated in Figure 9. As
drawn, the phase diagram G(τ) shown in the upper panel is “steep”, i.e. meaning that
kt+1 is quite sensitive to changes in kt. This in turn implies that relatively small changes
in steady state tax rates can induce large changes in steady state capital. When the
economy starts at k0, the tax rate is τ0 and the dynamics follows G(τ0), along this map,
capital increases by a large amount to k1 > k
∗. This causes the tax rate at t = 1 to
increase to τ1 causing a large shift in the phase diagram to G(τ1) which now lies on the
other side of G(τB). Given k1, there is a large drop in capital to k2 < k
∗. As drawn, the
cycle is convergent but the cycle could equally be stable or convergent.24
Proposition 6 Suppose there exists a poverty trap (k, τ) in an economy with optimal
taxation. Then, given that G1(k, τ) > 1, G1(k, τ)/[G1(k, τ)− 1] > 1,
24It is worth noting the difference with Palivos and Varvarigos [2010]; while they argue that environ-
mental taxation can be used to eliminate cycles associated with the impact of pollution on uncertain
lifetimes, our results show that second-best welfare-maximising environmental taxes can in themselves
be a source of oscillations.
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(i) the steady state will be locally unstable if g′(τ)h′(k) < 1;
(ii) the steady state will be convergent if
G1(k, τ)/[G1(k, τ)− 1] > g′(τ)h′(k) > 1;
(iii) there will be local oscillations if
g′(τ)h′(k) > G1(k, τ)/[G1(k, τ)− 1] > 1
.
4 Conclusions
This paper has shown that the combined effect of income and pollution on life expectancy
can lead to multiple interior steady states, with an unstable poverty trap and a stable,
neoclassical steady state. We examined the comparative static effects of exogenous tax
abatement policy and showed that this will widen the basin of the poverty trap and can
stimulate higher capital accumulation at the neoclassical steady state.
The main contribution of the paper has been the characterisation of the optimal environ-
mental taxation where a forward-looking planner sets taxes taking as given the optimal
saving decisions of each generation. We show that the optimal tax to abate pollution is
zero below a threshold capital and above this threshold, weakly increasing in the capital
stock. From a policy point of view, this suggests that economies that are close to or just
emerging from a poverty trap might impose zero or low levels of environmental protection
but eventually this will rise along the growth path.
More importantly, we have shown that optimal policy might itself contribute to complex
dynamics in several ways: first, when a steady state exists at which zero abatement is
optimal, optimal policy can create additional steady states with higher capital stocks and
positive levels of optimal abatement; second, by reversing the stability properties around
a given steady state type, i.e. a poverty trap can be locally stable while a neoclassical
steady state might be unstable; third, by inducing oscillations and cycles around steady
states which would otherwise generate monotonic dynamics.
With respect to the last finding, we offer a word of caution. Although there is evidence that
short term fluctuations in air quality can lead to fluctuations in mortality rates (see Evans
and Smith [2005], Huang et al. [2012]), it is not clear that these phenomena are in turn
part of a general business cycle or driven by seasonality. The main lesson that we would
like to emphasise through these findings is that in cases such as the one we have studied,
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where the impact of state variables on economic outcomes is not uniformly monotonic,
optimal policy itself can contribute to economic fluctuations and multiplicity of steady
states, rather than reduce them. Thus, models that impose steady state conditions to
derive optimal policy can be misleading about both the transitional dynamics and the
asymptotic outcomes.
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APPENDIX 1: Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof :
Note that pi is continuous and differentiable in its arguments which in turn are continuous
and differentiable in k. Therefore, pi is continuous and differentiable in k and G(k) is con-
tinuous and differentiable in k. Taking derivatives of both terms in G(k) and rearranging:
G′(k) =
[
Γkα
1 + pi(k)
] [
α
pi(k)
k
+
pi′(k)
1 + pi(k)
]
; (34)
it can be seen that the shape of G(k) can be quite different from the standard neoclassical
mapping, depending on how pi′(k) varies with k. Taking the right-hand limit of the two
terms inside square brackets, i.e. as k ↓ 0, the first term clearly goes to zero and the limit
of the second term inside square brackets can be expressed as
α ·
{
lim
k↓0
pi(k)
k
}
+
{
lim
k↓0
pi′(k)
1 + pi(k)
}
;
where the limit of the first term inside curly brackets is given by L’Hopital’s Rule for
right-hand limits25 as:
lim
k↓0
pi(k)
k
= lim
k↓0
pi′(k).
It can be seen that limk↓0 pi′(k) < ∞ is a sufficient condition for both the terms inside
curly brackets to remain finite so that G′(k) approaches zero as k ↓ 0.
APPENDIX 2: Derivation of ∂2pi/∂τ∂k
Recall that
∂pi
∂τ
=
piAψγAkαδzδ−1
(1 + zδ)2
Note that we can also write this as
∂pi
∂τ
=
piψγAkαδzδ−1
1 + zδ
Taking the derivative of the above with respect to k (after some straightforward rear-
rangement):
∂2pi
∂τ∂k
=
α
k
∂pi
∂τ
+
1
piA
∂pi
∂τ
∂piA
∂k
+
1
z(1 + zδ)
∂pi
∂τ
[(δ − 1)− (δ + 1)zδ]∂z
∂k
25See Proposition 4.37 and Remark 4.38 in Gharpade and Limaye (2006). For this proposition to apply
here, we must have limk↓0 k = 0 and limk↓0 pi(k) = 0. The former right-hand limit follows and the latter
follows by Assumption 1 equation (9).
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where
∂piA
∂k
=
α
k
ϑyϑ
(1 + yϑ)2
=
α
k
ϑyϑ
(1 + yϑ)
pi(1 + zδ)
(pi + yϑ))
and
∂z
∂k
=
αγ(1− ψτ)Akα
k
=
αz
k
The right hand side of the main derivative can be written as
∂pi
∂τ
[
α
k
+
(1 + zδ)
piA
αpi
k
ϑyϑ
(1 + yϑ)yϑ
+
α
k
z − φz′
z(1 + zδ)
[(δ − 1)− (δ + 1)zδ]
]
Finally, expanding the term in square brackets involving zδ and noting the definition of
pi, we get
∂pi
∂τ
[
α
k
+
1
pi
{
αpi
k
(
ϑyϑ
(1 + yϑ)yϑ
− zδz
δ−1
(1 + zδ)
)
+
αpiδ
k
z
(1 + zδ)z
− αpi
k
z
z
}]
;
from which, noting the definition of ∂pi/∂k, it follows that
∂2pi
∂τ∂k
=
∂pi
∂τ
1
k
[
α +
k
pi
∂pi
∂k
+
αδz
(1 + zδ)z
− α
]
;
leading to the desired result.
APPENDIX 3: An example of the survival probability function:
Assuming the functional form:
pi = piApiB
where
piA =
yϑ
1 + yϑ
then it can be shown that piAy > 0 and that pi
A
yy ≤ 0 if and only if y ≤ [(ϑ− 1)/(1 + ϑ)]1/ϑ
so that for any ϑ > 1, piA(y) is S-shaped upwards.
If similarly,
piB =
1
1 + zδ
then it can be shown that piBz < 0 and that pi
B
zz ≤ 0 if and only if z ≤ [(δ − 1)/(1 + δ)]1/δ
so that for any δ > 1, piB(z) is reverse S-shaped downwards.
Thus, the above function satisfies the sufficient conditions for multiple steady states, and
after imposing the steady state relationship between y, z and k and totally differentiating,
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that a sufficient condition for pi′(k) to satisfy the conditions of Lemma 1 as k approaches
zero is ϑ > 1/α. For this case, it can be shown that a weaker condition
ϑ >
1− α
α
suffices to generate G′(0) = 0.
This is because the combination of the terms
G′(k) =
[
Γkα
1 + pi(k)
] [
α
pi(k)
k
− pi
′(k)
1 + pi(k)
]
.
can converge to zero even if each term inside the square brackets does not.
We now assign the following parameter values
α = 1/3, A = 2.4, γ = 1.11, ϑ = 9, δ = 5, ψ = 0.8;
and using MATLAB, we trace out the phase diagram of the capital stock for τ = 0 and
τ = 0.55. The results have been depicted in Figure 2.
The original steady states, at τ = 0, are k` = 0.035 and kh = 0.114 respectively. An
increase in the abatement tax to τ = 0.55 causes a downward shift in G(k) at low levels
of capital stock but upwards at the high capital stock. There are two new steady states,
k∗′` = 0.050 and k
∗′
h = 0.158 respectively. Compared with their respective predecessors,
both steady states have higher levels of capital stock. The dynamic implication is that the
basin of attraction of a trivial steady state has now increased, while economies that start
off to the right of k∗′` can now converge to a higher steady state than before. Thus, with
an increase in the exogenous tax, it is possible that long-run cross-country inequality will
increase.
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